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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- METROPOLITAN STEVEDORE CO. v. RAMBO et
- al.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the ninth circuit
- No. 94-820. Argued April 25, 1995-Decided June 12, 1995
-
- Respondent Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore
- and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he
- sustained while working for petitioner as a longshore frontman.
- Subsequently, he acquired new skills and obtained longshore work
- as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury
- earnings, though his physical condition remained unchanged.
- Petitioner filed an application to modify the disability award under
- LHWCA 22 on the ground that there had been a ``change in
- conditions'' so that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administra-
- tive Law Judge terminated the disability payments, and the Benefits
- Review Board affirmed, relying on its 1984 Fleetwood decision that
- a change in wage-earning capacity is a change in conditions under
- 22. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 22 authorizes
- modification only where there has been a change in an employee's
- physical condition.
- Held: A disability award may be modified under 22 where there is
- a change in an employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any
- change in the employee's physical condition. Pp. 3-10.
- (a) A narrow reading of the phrase ``change in conditions'' is not
- supported by the Act's language, structure, and purpose. Section
- 22's use of the plural ``conditions'' suggests that Congress did not
- intend to limit the bases for modifying awards to a single condition,
- such as an employee's physical health. Rather, under the normal or
- natural reading, the applicable ``conditions'' are those that entitled
- the employee to benefits in the first place, the same conditions on
- which continuing entitlement is predicated. This interpretation is
- confirmed by the language of LHWCA 2(10) and 8(c)(21), which
- make it clear that compensation, as an initial matter, is predicated
- on loss of wage-earning capacity and should continue only while the
- incapacity to earn wages persists. Thus, disability is in essence an
- economic, not a medical, concept. The Act's fundamental purpose is
- to compensate employees for wage-earning capacity lost because of
- injury; where that capacity has been reduced, restored, or improved,
- the basis for compensation changes and modification is permitted.
- Pp. 3-7.
- (b) The legislative history also does not support a narrow con-
- struction of 22. Congress' decision to maintain a 1-year limitations
- period in which to seek modification does not indicate a congressio-
- nal intent to limit other parts of 22. Nor is there any evidence
- that when Congress reenacted the phrase ``change in conditions'' as
- late as 1984, it was endorsing prior Court of Appeals' decisions
- limiting the phrase to changes in physical conditions. In addition,
- the dicta in those cases that Rambo claims is swept away by the
- Court's reading of 22 is neither authoritative nor persuasive.
- Finally, experience in the 11 years since Fleetwood does not suggest
- that the Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP) and
- courts will be flooded with litigation arising from modification
- requests based on every change in an employee's wages. Such an
- argument is better directed at Congress or the OWCP Director than
- at the courts; and it is based on a misconception of the LHWCA and
- the instant holding, for a change in wage-earning capacity will occur
- with a change in actual wages only when those wages fairly and
- reasonably represent such capacity. Pp. 7-10.
- 28 F. 3d 86, reversed and remanded.
- Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
- quist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
- Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
-